The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Wirtz provides a persuasive explanation for how the Vietnamese achieved surprise at Tet, even though the Americans had intelligence warning them of the attack. His book should be required reading for those interested in this key aspect of the Vietnam War and in the study of intelligence failures. -Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., Journal of American History

A fascinating book. Combining the disciplines of history and political science with insights from psychological theory, Wirtz has produced both a pathbreaking analysis and a cautionary tale. -Heath Twichell, Naval War College Review

Wirtz analyzes both the North Vietnamese plans and the American effort to counter them in exquisite detail. . . . His book is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the Vietnam conflict and the pitfalls facing an intelligence effort to divine an enemy's plans. -Roger Hilsman, Political Science Quarterly

This excellently researched and written volume is a positive addition to our understanding of the event that marked the turning point in U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. -John R. Finch, Military Review