by Andreas Dur (Author)
The liberalization of transatlantic trade relations since the Great Depression is one of the key developments in the global political economy of the last hundred years. This period has seen the negotiated reduction of both tariffs and nontariff barriers among developed countries, which allowed for the rapid expansion of trade flows, a driving force of economic globalization. In Protection for Exporters, Andreas Dur provides a novel explanation for this phenomenon that stresses the role of societal interests in shaping trade politics. He argues that exporters lobby more in reaction to losses of foreign market access than in pursuit of opportunities, thus providing a rationale for periods of acceleration and slowdown in the pace of liberalization.
Dur also presents hypotheses about the form in which protection for exporters is provided (preferential or nonpreferential) and the balance of concessions that is exchanged in trade negotiations. Protection for Exporters includes case studies of major developments in international trade relations, such as the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in the 1930s, the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the 1940s, the Kennedy Round in the 1960s, the debate over Fortress Europe in the 1980s, and U.S.-European competition over access to emerging markets in the early 2000s.
Dur's rigorous argument and systematic empirical analyses not only explain transatlantic trade relations but also allow for a better understanding of the dynamics of international economic relations.
Format: Hardcover
Pages: 264
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: Apr 2010
ISBN 10: 0801448239
ISBN 13: 9780801448232
Protection for Exporters is a must-read for anyone interested in the politics of trade policy in a highly interdependent world. This book goes beyond existing accounts of U.S. trade policy and develops an original argument backed by a comprehensive empirical evaluation. Andreas Dur shows how trade policy liberalization since 1945 has been driven by fears of discrimination in foreign markets and the need for governments to protect exporters. -Cedric Dupont, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
Protection for Exporters is an innovative and solid contribution to the literature on interstate trade relations. By provocatively challenging the by-now axiomatic understandings of the possibility for collective action and showing the conditions under which exporters, too, would mobilize, Andreas Dur offers a refreshing new explanation for shifts in international trade policies. -Nitsan Chorev, Brown University
In Protection for Exporters, Andreas Dur argues that exporter lobbying against foreign discrimination provides an important motivation for reciprocal trade liberalization on both sides of the Atlantic. His results will be interesting not only to political scientists but also to economists who study preferential trading areas and global cooperation. -Robert Pahre, Director, European Union Center, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign