The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods

by Richard Cornes (Author), Todd Sandler (Author)

• Used

  Paperback
  1986

  $3.56

  This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e., uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. Aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students making their first serious foray into this branch of economics, the book will also interest professional economists wanting to discover what their colleagues in public economics have been working on in recent years. As such, it attempts to tie together the most recent contributions in public economics, available in many diverse sources. The book will be suitable for courses concerned with public expenditure analysis, where no other single source for this material is currently available. Applications, theory, and policy aspects of public expenditure analysis are presented. Useful new graphical tools are also included. Among the topics included are: Nash equilibria, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanisms, Coase theorem, externalities, and game theory.

• New

  Paperback
  2008

  $51.37

  This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, Coase Theorem, and static and repeated games. The authors use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization.